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Regional Councils are primarily responsible for environmental management, as specified in the 
Resource Management Act (RMA), 1991. The Local Government Act 2002 has an integrative 
component, requiring consideration of social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being 
of  their  communities.  These  two  Acts  are  interesting,  as  their  combination  is  shaping  new 
governance structures within New Zealand. Different types of policy instruments are available to 
Regional Councils while carrying out their functions: regulatory, economic and voluntary. The 
1990s are characterized by ‘first generation Plans’ of the RMA, which were highly rule focused. 
In the 2000s a marked shift occurred, mainstreaming ‘community’ and participative approaches 
to policy. This increased levels of trust between communities and the Regional Councils, and can 
be seen as building blocks in the formation of social capital. Where rules were not achieving 
particular policy objectives, interesting new hybrid forms of governance emerged.  
This paper looks at these newly-formed partnership approaches in New Zealand. The paper 
traces the emergence of partnerships as a collective form of action, and analyses them from an 
economic  governance  perspective.  In  so  doing,  the  fundamental  role  of  social  capital  is 
explained, as a rational economic concept. Regional Councils are centrally placed to anchor 
partnerships and strengthen their formation, hence strengthening social networks within the 
regions. The issue of riparian management is explored as a case study to inform how this could 
occur. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
As with management of most natural resources, the issue of freshwater quality is inherently 
complex. It involves a diverse set of freshwater users, land owners, stakeholders and regulators. 
In  May  2011,  a  National  Policy  Statement  for  Freshwater  Management  was  issued  in  New 
Zealand. This requires regional councils to change their plans in line with a set of freshwater 
objectives and quality limits, to be defined at regional level. A significant problem in many areas 
of  New  Zealand  with  regard  to  freshwater  pollution  relates  to  livestock  having  access  to 
streams.  This  is  largely  as  they  are  unfenced,  and  do  not  have  riparian  zones  along  the 
waterway, which act as a buffer between land related activities and the fresh waterway.  
Regional councils have a range of policy options to tackle resource management problems. This 
paper explores the approach taken in different regions, with a particular emphasis on voluntary 
approaches to riparian management. Recent developments in the literature on governance of 
natural  and  common  pool  resources  stress  localised  collective  action  as  a  policy  solution 
(Ostrom,  2005;  Bowles  and  Gintis,  2002).  By  bringing  together  local  stakeholders  in  a 
participative  and  inclusive  format,  social  capital  can  be  created.  Despite  the  numerous 
definitions of social capital, this paper looks at the pivotal role of government agencies in the 
formation of social capital – the ‘linking’ social capital between citizens/communities and state.  
This  paper  looks  at  newly-formed  partnership  approaches  in  New  Zealand  in  the  riparian 
management area. The emergence of partnerships as a collective form of action are traced, and 
analysed from an economic governance perspective. In so doing, the fundamental role of social 
capital is explained, as a rational economic concept. It can be an efficient means of achieving 
policy objectives. It also may avoid the transaction costs that are associated with a regulatory 
process, involving the judiciary.   
Social capital does not spontaneously emerge within the economy. It may exist, but not be 
utilised or used for productive purposes. The importance of lead agents is highlighted in this 
paper,  and  case  studies  of  ‘active’  voluntary  approaches  by  regional  councils  illustrate  the 
pivotal role that regional councils can play in anchoring civic relations.  
The paper introduces the literature on social capital (section 1), with particular focus on the 
three types: bridging, bonding and linking social capital. It is linking social capital that overcomes 
vertical  ties  that  people  form  with  political  or  economic  agencies.  It  encourages  real  civic 
participation and builds trust between government agencies and communities (section 2). The 
responsibilities of local government are briefly introduced in section 3, particularly the Resource 
Management  Act (RMA)  and  the  Local  Government  Act  2002  (LGA).  These  illustrate  a  dual 
approach of establishing rights and proving effects in the RMA, and a more integrative and well-
being focus in the LGA.  What has resulted is a new direction in local government processes, 
with interesting outcomes. A typology of policy approaches is presented in section 4, namely 
regulatory,  economic  and  voluntary  approaches.  These  are  used  to  classify  the  different - 3 - 
 
approaches taken in various regions regarding riparian management – the subject of the case 
study  in  section  5.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  on  voluntary  riparian  management 
approaches and social capital formation (section 6). This paper stylises the voluntary approach 
as being an inherently appropriate governance structure. However, without rose tinted glasses, 
it is recognised that voluntary approaches to resource management are not suitable for all 
regions or cases. The biggest hindrance is if farmers cannot afford to implement best riparian 
management,  including  fencing,  planting  and  providing  alternative  water  stations  for  stock. 
Nevertheless, the paper argues that there are rational arguments for voluntary approaches, 
which can be used with other policy approaches. 
A voluntary approach seeks to establish social acceptance of a practice, such that the practice 
will be implemented by the respective stakeholders involved. The advantage of a voluntary 
approach is that it is unobtrusive, landowners that modify their behaviour would do so willingly 
and the perceived control or power balance does not shift from the landowner/user to the 
regulating authority. 
Social capital is formed when networks of individuals form a common bond or interest between 
them. In society many networks exist, ranging from social friendships to formalised business 
groups. This is a form of capital which can be used for productive purposes. As yet, it remains 
largely untapped in the governance of natural resources. There is potential to use existing and 
create social capital through processes of well-designed environmental partnerships.  Regional 
councils have a role to play in this regard, as they are centrally placed to anchor partnerships 
and  strengthen  their  formation,  hence  strengthening  social  networks  within  the  regions. - 4 - 
 
 
1.  SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION  
Social  capital  has  many  definitions.  It  is  used  as  an  indicator  for  the  general  health  of  a 
democratic  market  economy  –  with  links  established  between  social  capital  and  economic 
growth or development (Knack, 1999; Healy, 2002). From a traditional economic perspective 
‘capital’ is an input in the production process, which contributes to the realisation of profits at a 
firm  level.  Social  capital  is  seen  as  a  ‘soft’  input  in  this  production  mix;  not  because  its 
contribution to the productive process is in doubt, but because it is difficult to is measure and 
include in economic models, as more physical and tangible capital are. Social capital is seen by 
rational choice theorists as the norms and sets of behaviour that enable market transactions 
(Fukuyama,  2000).  The  more  people  trust  each  other,  the  more  they  are  able  to  establish 
contracts with each other, and markets are based on contracting (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1985). Ostrom and Ahn (2003) define social capital as rules used by those governing, managing, 
and using the system and those factors that reduce the transaction costs associated with the 
monitoring and enforcement of these rules. Harnessing positive benefits led Putnam (1995: 67) 
to  define  social  capital  as  ‘the  norms  and  networks  of  civil  society  that  enable  groups  of 
individuals to cooperate for mutual benefit (and perhaps for broader social benefit) and may 
allow social institutions to perform more productively’. From a sociological perspective, social 
capital is viewed as social ties between individuals, or communities of association. Bourdieu 
(1986) stressed the networks of interaction that constitute social capital. Location and position 
within the network is important, while the network itself provides opportunities for individuals 
to exploit resources which their social relations give access to.  
Levels of trust within the group or network increase over time, otherwise group members will 
exit or will be expelled from the group. The group coalesce or come together for the mutual 
benefit of the members. There are benefits from collectively working together or associating 
with the group. Members of the group cooperate with one another. Despite variations in the 
origin and differing definitions of social capital, the concept has common characteristics based 
on  the  formation  of  social  networks.  Social  capital  is  dependent  on  the  nature  of  the 
relationships between people, the motives for group formation and the social networks they 
form.
1  
Three forms of social capital  are classified: ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’. The typology is 
defined by the way individuals or groups are connected through social ties (Grootaert et al. 
2003: 6). ‘Bonding’ social capital refers to relations among people with a similar background and 
interests,  and  the  interaction  of  a  group  network  bonds  the  social  capital  between  them. 
                                                           
1 This can also be used for group motives that are undesirable to society – such as crime. The payoffs for 
the members may warrant the formation of the group, despite it being considered negative social capital. 
See Portes (1998) for a fuller description of negative social capital.   - 5 - 
 
‘Bridging’ social capital connects groups of differing characteristics, and relates to relationships 
outside the group. ‘Bridging’ and ‘bonding’ types of social capital refers to horizontal relations in 
or between groups, while the more recent term ‘linking’ denotes the vertical ties people have 
formed  with  political  or  economic  authorities.  The  term,  thus,  denotes  connections  across 
power differentials. 
Brehm and Rahn (1997) developed a framework for understanding social capital, and it is a 
useful basic departure for analysing the process of social capital formation in a regional council 
context. It shows a reciprocal relationship between civic engagement, interpersonal trust and 
confidence in government. The more that individuals participate in their communities, the more 
they learn to trust others; the greater the trust that individuals hold for others, the more likely 
they are to participate, which in turn leads to civic participation with the State. Putnam (1993) is 
credited with operationalising the above concept of social capital for empirical analysis. He saw 
it as being ‘embodied in forms such as civic and religious groups, bonds of  family, informal 
community networks, kinship and friendship, and norms of reciprocity, volunteerism, altruism 
and trust’ (ibid: 67). His most acknowledged contribution to the theory is the proxy indicator 
that measured the density of voluntary organisations, termed the ‘Putnam instrument’. 
Figure 1 Structural framework of social capital 
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Source Brehm and Rahn (1997:1002) 
It  is  through  civic  engagement  and  confidence  in  government  where  regional  councils  can 
influence  the  formation  of  social  capital,  particularly  ‘linking’  social  capital.  The  LGA  has 
strengthened  the  community  involvement  in  decision  making  processes  (see  Section  3)  – 
thereby an attempt to align the private good with the public good. There is potential to anchor 
the partnerships that form at a community level and strengthen the ties to local government in 
New Zealand. Social networks can be strengthened within the regions, with the regional councils 
acting as a medium and perhaps taking the lead on this process. The study of leadership in social 
networks was often ignored in the literature, but studies have stressed the pivotal role played - 6 - 
 
by leaders in group formation (Hurrelmann et al, 2006). Beneficial cooperative behaviour within 
a group does not spontaneously emerge, but requires strong agents to drive the process. In the 
New Zealand context with mandatory partnerships that resulted as part of government process, 
these agents have been termed ‘strategic brokers’ (Larner and Craig, 2005).  The extent to which 
individuals  and  communities  actually  influence  decision  making  processes  requires  further 
investigation. It would require an analysis of the effectiveness of consultation (that is whether it 
was used as a ‘process’ only, or whether meaningful  dialogue resulted). Other group processes 
are  important,  such  as  antisocial  punishment  (Rand  and  Nowak,  2011)  whereby  non-co-
operators punish co-operators in public good games. These may explain why social capital does 
not form as expected, but are beyond the focus of this paper. 
Healy (2004) identifies the role of the State to be that of supporting rather than controlling 
networks. This can be applied to the local government context, as they create rules and govern, 
particularly natural resources. He outlines a number of important design principles useful to 
consider in a social capital policy framework. These are summarised as:  
1. Cultivating mutual help and self-help;  
2. A movement away from identifying ‘needs’ only to identifying unique community 
‘capabilities’;  
3. Promoting trust through equality and respect for rights;  
4. Letting go of excessive and over-detailed control (empowering and trusting 
communities to be responsible);  
5. Valuing, rewarding and recognising voluntary effort and achievement.  
 
It is important to examine the ways in which the design of public policies contributes to social 
capital or not, and this paper focuses on the ‘linking’ role of local government in New Zealand. In 
any  society,  distance  from  power,  lack  of  meaningful  consultation,  absence  of  deliberative 
mechanisms and a general sense of not being included in key decisions would create a lack of 
trust and engagement in the long-run. Letting go and empowering emerge as crucial areas for 
policy examination (Healy, 2004). The following section gives an overview of the level of civic 
engagement in local government, followed by an exploration of how this theory aligns with the 
New Zealand local government jurisdiction.  
2.  CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Civic  engagement  can  take  on  many  forms  –  membership  of  interest  groups,  sports  clubs, 
voluntary associations and political groups are examples of a few. Putnam (1993) advanced 
knowledge and practical measurement of this concept. Civic engagement also takes the form of 
participating in the formal institutions of a country. In a representative democratic political - 7 - 
 
system,  one  form  of  civic  engagement  is  the  interaction  of  citizen  with  central  and  local 
government. A partial measure of this civil engagement is participation in the voting system.
2 
Voter turnout for local government elections peaked in 1989, and have been declining between 
then  and  2007  (DIA,  2011).  It  is  significant  that  there  was  considerable  ref orm  and 
amalgamation of local authorities in 1989. There was an increase in voter turnout for local 
government in 2010, largely attributed to increases in Auckland and Christchurch . Again  there 
was considerable reform in both regions  during this year, which increased awareness of the 
roles and functions of local government.  
Table 1 Voter turnout by type of body, 1989-2010 
%   Year  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004  2007  2010 
Regional Councils  56  52  48  53  49  45  43  47 
Auckland Council  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  51 
City Mayors  52  48  49  51  45  43  41  46 
District Councils  52  48  49  51  45  43  41  46 
Community Boards  54  49  50  50  46  42  41  50 
DHBs  -  -  -  -  50  46  43  49 
Trusts  55  -  -  -  -  48  43  47 
Source: DIA 2011:23 
In terms of voter turnout Vowles (2004) traces the decline of civic engagement in New Zealand 
(although not specifically looking at local government). While acknowledging that there is not a 
lot of information on this component of social capital, his research showed that participation in 
elections  was  largely  dependent  on  age  cohort;  those  born  after  1974  were  less  likely  to 
participate. This trend in voter turnout is described as a ‘decline’ rather than a ‘demise’ of civic 
engagement,  given  that  New  Zealand’s  participation  rates  were  still  above  comparator 
countries.  
There  are  many  contributing  factors  to  a  decline  of  civic  engagement,  and  Vowles  (2004) 
describes the ‘democratic phoenix’, whereby there are new forms of participation emerging to 
take  place  of  the  old.  These  could  include  signed  petitions,  letters  to  paper,  boycotts, 
demonstrations, talk-back radio, internet based association and blogging to name a few. Also if 
the functions of local government become less relevant to people, there is little incentive to 
engage.  
Local  government  traditionally  provides  services  such  as  providing  water,  wastewater 
treatment, refuse collection, local infrastructure and environmental services (in the broadest 
sense, as defined by the RMA). These services put financial pressure on councils, and ultimately 
                                                           
2 It is described as partial, as the level of engagement between citizen and State organization depends on 
the levels of service delivered by the State, and the opportunity to engage with policy and government 
programmes.  - 8 - 
 
on rates. Dollery (2008) recognised the need for new funding sources for the activities of local 
government,  largely  focusing  on  strengthening  the  working  relationship  between  local  and 
central government.  Little mention is made of using and capitalising on the resources within the 
regions themselves, and in particular harnessing the existing networks and social capital that 
exist.  The  following  section  gives  an  introduction  of  the  functions  of  local  government,  to 
illustrate the areas for potential harnessing of social capital.  
 
3.  REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
New  Zealand  is  divided  into  sixteen  regions,  with  eleven  regional  councils  and  five  unitary 
authorities.
3 This section focuses on two pieces of legislation that govern regional counci ls in 
New Zealand, and summary components of the two Acts are presented to illustrate the 
potential use of the Acts for the development of social capital.
4 The Local Government Act (LGA) 
introduced in 2002 was a comprehensive overhaul of the law relating t o local government, as 
introduced in 1974. Notably the LGA2002 challenges local government in New Zealand to 
rethink the way it manages what it does, and how it does it (Houston and Katavic, 2006).  The 
Resource Management Act (RMA)  introduced in 1991 is the main piece of legislation in New 
Zealand governing sustainable management of the environment.   These two Acts   are the 
dominant statutes guiding the functions of the regional councils in New Zealand. Both   are 
interesting, as their combination is shaping ne w governance structures within New Zealand , 
manifest at a local government level. New Zealand local government is a creature of statute, but 
is autonomous and accountable to its communities and ratepayers (Houston and Katavic, 2006). 
Therefore  it  plays  a  p ivotal  role  in  the  nexus  of  civic  engagement.  New  Zealand  local 
government  have  fewer  functions  than  many  of  their  counterparts  overseas ,  who  are 
responsible for social services such as housing and health and in some cases where functions 
such as policing and education are devolved to the local level.  
Two important features of the RMA are that controls are intended to be effects -based rather 
than activity based and environmental management responsibilities have been largely devolved 
to regional government. Under RMA ‘sustainable management’ means: 
‘..managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a 
way, or at a rate which enables people and communicates to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while- 
                                                           
3 A unitary authority is responsible for also carrying out regional council functions alongside their more 
localized territorial authority functions.  
4 Components of these Acts were chosen to explain the issue of riparian management which this paper 
uses as a case study.  - 9 - 
 
a)   Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
b)   Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
c)   Avoiding,  remedying,  or  mitigating  any  adverse  effects  of  activities  on  the 
environment’ 
The RMA makes reference to some ‘Matters of National Importance’, for example: 
‘The preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including 
the coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins, and 
the protection of them from inappropriate subdivision, use and development.’ 
 
The  decline  of  civic  engagement  in  New  Zealand  (see  previous  section)  contributed  to  the 
zeitgeist when local government was being reformed in 2002. Particularly there was concern 
over lack of grass-roots community participation in decision making. What resulted was a strong 
focus of community participation in the ensuing local government reforms.   
The purpose of the LGA was to provide for democratic and effective local government that 
recognised the diversity of New Zealand communities. The Act: 
 
a)   stated the purpose of local government; and 
b)   provided  a  framework  and  powers  for  local  authorities  to  decide  which 
activities they undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them; 
and 
c)  promoted the accountability of local authorities to their communities; and 
d)   provided for local authorities to play a broad role in promoting the social, 
economic,  environmental,  and  cultural  well-being  of  their  communities, 
taking a sustainable development approach. 
Explicitly,  the  LGA  outlines  the  guiding  principle  of  ‘well-being’,  with  four  types  specified: 
cultural,  environmental,  social  and  economic.  Well-being  is  associated  with  a  healthy 
functioning system. Therefore the LGA had a holistic view of the contribution made by people, 
households, businesses and communities to the economy and society, while by necessity having 
an integrative component – as the well-beings do not operate in isolation. Consideration of 
social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being of communities became mandatory.  
This is interesting for resource management  – and ‘well-being’ aligns with a healthy, hence 
sustainable, resource management system. Yet the two Acts are independent of each other, but 
regional councils adhere to both in the policy making process.  - 10 - 
 
4.  POLICY APPROACHES IN REGIONAL COUNCILS 
Three  types  of  policy  instruments  are  cited  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  regional  councils: 
regulatory, economic and voluntary (Stavins, 2004). All three are discussed here in the context 
of the two Acts, largely governing regional councils – however the focus is between regulatory 
approaches  and  voluntary,  as  these  are  more  akin  to  the  philosophy  and  resulting  policy 
processes of the RMA and LGA respectively.  
Regulatory, sometimes labelled command-and-control policy instruments include: ownership 
and property right assignments, determination of whether rights exist; compulsory regulations; 
and compulsory technology based standards. The introduction of regulation does not guarantee 
a  success  in  policy  outcomes.  Problems  of  state  regulation  have  been  attributed  to  ‘weak 
political commitment and accountability, inadequate resourcing and staffing, poor policy design 
and/or  weak  monitoring  and  enforcement’  (Bennett,  1999).  The  RMA  is  an  effects-based 
approach to environmental management and frequent use of regulatory instruments has been 
the norm over the last 20 years. In particular, the RMA resulted in the specification of rights 
along a hierarchal scale of: 
  permitted  activity  -  allowing  activity  to  be  carried  out  as  a  right,  unless  a  plan  or 
legislative rule restricts that right – no resource consent is required;  
  controlled activity – requiring consent, which cannot be refused for a controlled activity 
which meets the standards set out in the Plan; Conditions may be imposed on matters 
where the Regional Council exercise control. If it does not meet the standards, the activity 
falls back into either a discretionary or non-complying activity; 
  discretionary activity - requiring consents as per the title, with the Regional Council 
having discretionary right to grant a consent or not. The Council can impose conditions on a 
discretionary activity; 
  non-complying activity – is outside of permitted activity in a plan, but with a possibility 
to apply to undertake the activity. The applicant must apply for a consent whereby the 
Council exercise full discretion on whether the consent is granted or not;  
  prohibited activity – no application can be lodged to undertake an activity that is listed 
as a prohibited activity in a regional plan.   
Economic  policy  instruments  make  use  of  financial  incentives/disincentives  such  as 
subsidies/taxes, and more innovative performance based instruments such as tradable pollution 
permits.  There  have  been  many  innovative  approaches  undertaken  with  economic  policy 
instruments worldwide (Greenhalgh and Selman, 2005), and indeed in New Zealand, many of 
which are carefully designed modifications of basic instruments. Taxes place a financial burden 
on polluters. Subsidies provide incentives to implement best management practices, aimed at - 11 - 
 
providing public goods such as environmental benefits. Subsidies offer positive incentives to 
modify behaviour. Many other economic policy instruments exist, but are beyond the discussion 
of this paper.
5 
Voluntary  policy  instruments  attempt  to  motivate  action  or  behavioural  change  through 
education or  extension.  Clearly, voluntary/advisory  policy  is  not  sufficient  to  change  the 
behaviour of all actors. The question arises as to  whether it is in a business’s self-interest to 
move beyond compliance with existing legislative requirements and adopt a ‘proactive’ stance 
on  a  particular  matter  (e.g.  environmental  management),  voluntarily  exceeding  mandated 
minimum  performance  standards  (Gunningham  and  Sinclair,  2002).  The  cleaner  production 
literature proposes an integration of sound environmental process, pollution prevention and 
waste reduction activities into a firm’s core decision making strategy in order to maximise profit 
on environmental grounds, effectively becoming environmental leaders (see Box 4).  
Despite  apparent  benefits,  along  with  the  virtues  of  being  non-coercive  and  unobtrusive, 
voluntary schemes have low reliability of achieving outcomes. Their success depends on the 
extent of the gap between the public and private interest, and the ability of the business to pay 
for the environmental improvements. Voluntary policy approaches rely on a degree of trust 
between the targeted stakeholders of that voluntary policy and the government agency. It relies 
on well-informed stakeholders acting in the public/common good, once they are made aware of 
the public benefits that would result from a certain type of behaviour. The advantage of a 
voluntary approach is that it is non-obtrusive, behaviour is modified willingly and the perceived 
control  or  power  balance  does  not  shift  from  the  compliant  stakeholder  to  the  regulating 
authority.  This  builds  social  capital  between  regulating  agency  and  individual 
stakeholder/ratepayer. 
In practice, no policy solution ever relies purely on one type of instrument, and the case study of 
riparian management in New Zealand is explored for evidence of each type of policy approach. 
Problems of water quality are complex and no one policy solution fits all – particularly given that 
farm systems are not homogenous, grazing patterns are unique to each farm and the physical 
attributes of each farm need to be considered when designing a policy response. 
 
5.  CASE STUDY – RIPARIAN MANAGEMENT IN REGIONAL COUNCILS 
This section introduces the case study of riparian management in New Zealand. The issue of 
freshwater  quality  is  inherently  complex,  as  the  actions  of  one  user  are  felt  by  those 
downstream and effective management requires the commitment of many land owners and 
                                                           
5 Economic instruments are not the focus of this paper, but interested readers can look to the NZARES 
Conference papers from 2008, which were dedicated to ‘Economic Instruments – an idea whose time has 
come’ which give an overview of their use in New Zealand.  - 12 - 
 
land users. Of particular concern in farming regions throughout New Zealand is the damage to 
the freshwater system caused by livestock having access to streams and rivers. The main issues 
are (Davies-Colley and Parkyn, 2001):  
•  Remnant native vegetation in the riparian zone is degraded by livestock access to the 
stream. 
•  This leads to reduced shade and shelter, resulting in drying of soils in riparian zones. 
•  Compacting  of  soils  and  damage  to  their  structure  reduces  infiltration  capacity  and 
reduces contaminant trapping capacity. 
•  Destabilised stream banks and channels result in erosion, streambed siltation and water 
turbidity. 
•  Temperature, river flows, streambed substrates, food resources are adversely affected. 
•  Results in reduced water quality from sediment inputs, overland flow of nutrients and 
microbial contamination from animal waste.  
•  Removal of the function of a riparian ‘sink’ to trap contaminants off the land. 
•  This leads to degraded stream habitat and reduced stream health resulting from the 
above damages as indicated by changed composition of aquatic invertebrate animals, 
and reduced abundance of certain native fish. 
Optimal riparian management, for good environmental outcomes, requires livestock exclusion 
from waterways and the planting of restorative vegetation in riparian zones.  
 
5.1 GOVERNANCE AND LEGISLATION 
Water quality and management of the freshwater resource is one which is governed by regional 
councils through the RMA (Box 1). Local government is responsible for implementing these 
policies in a way which is consistent with the set national policies (see Box 2) and also respects 
the nature of local riparian areas as well as the values and needs of their communities. The most 
recent  change  in  legislation  relates  to  the  National  Policy  Statement  for  Freshwater 
Management (NPS), introduced by the Ministry for Environment in 2011. 
Box 1 Riparian and Freshwater Management in the RMA 
In  respect  to  lake  beds  and  rivers  the  RMA  restricts  reclaiming  or  draining  the  bed  and 
depositing substances, as well as introducing plant material.  The RMA also protects riparian 
habitats by forbidding the damage or disruption to habitats of animals and plants, requiring 
resource consent or meeting certain criteria for these actions to take place (Section 3.13). 
Sections 3.14 and 3.15 of the RMA also include restrictions on the use, taking, damming, or 
diversion of water and as well as the discharge of water and contaminants into waterways. 
Section 15 of the RMA provides the legal sanctions for controlling discharges of contaminants 
into water, or onto land.  The presumption in Section 15(1) is that a discharge is prohibited 
unless it is expressly allowed by resource consent, a rule in the plan, or regulations. 
Section 17(1) addresses externalities as it states that “every person has a duty to avoid, remedy, 
or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment arising from an activity carried on by or on 
behalf of that person.” - 13 - 
 
 
Box 2 National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management  
The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management requires regional councils to change 
plans as required to: ‘establish freshwater objectives and set freshwater quality limits for all 
bodies of fresh water in their regions’.  
The National Policy Statement does not set minimum quality requirements or discharge limits. 
Each regional council can choose how to implement the NPS.  
Councils are required to impose discharge permits to ensure freshwater objectives are achieved. 
Councils have two options to give effect to the NPS: a ‘go-early’ timeframe of December 2014; 
or to wait until 2030 to give it effect. Therefore there is considerable time available to regional 
councils to give effect to it.  
 
The devolution of setting water quality standards to regional and local government require 
local/regional funding of measures to address water quality issues. Local/regional funds are 
most commonly raised from property taxes (rates) with part of the costs paid by farmers and 
rural landowners, part from industry and business and another component paid from urban 
households.  Hatton  MacDonald  (2004)  observes  that  there  appeared  to  be  some  political 
aversion to environmental charges that involve differentiated charge rates based on the polluter 
pays principle – hence landowners did not have to internalise their water pollution costs. Given 
the increased understanding of our environment and an awareness of effects, if we were to 
design a system of rules ‘from scratch’, society would expect that polluters would pay for the 
consequences of some or all of their actions. However, regional councils approach the problem 
with an existing set of behavioural ‘norms’ from landowners. The problem faced by regional 
councils is to design freshwater policy that changes the behaviour of landowners.  
 
5.2 BENEFITS AND COSTS OF RIPARIAN MANAGEMENT 
Optimal riparian management creates benefits for the land owner, but also has public benefits 
to  society  –  in  the  form  of  stream  health  impacts,  recreational  and  amenity  benefits  and 
knowledge  that  the  waterways  are kept  clean  for  future  generations. There are  public  and 
private benefits to effective riparian management, shown in Table 2. Hence it seems logical that 
there would be action to realise these joint benefits. Cost is a major limiting factor. The costs of 
restoring riparian zones include loss of productive land and the cost of providing alternative 
stock drinking stations which are borne by the land owner. There are also costs of fencing, the 
time and labour required to restore riparian zones, the cost of the plants/grasses/trees which 
are met either by the land owner or the public – depending on the policy chosen to address 
riparian management. They are termed distributed costs in Table 2. - 14 - 
 
Table 2 Summary of Public and Private Costs and Benefits of restoring Riparian Zones 
  Private (including downstream 
farmers) 
Public 
Benefits  Improved stock health 
Improved water quality  
Soil improvement 
Increased land values 
Production of marketable products 
(e.g. carbon credits, harvestable 
products) 
Marketing on environmental grounds 
Amenity value of landscapes 
Ecosystem restoration and Ecological 
benefits   
Bequest of integral ecosystem to future 
generations 
     
Costs  Loss of productive land 
Capital costs for alternative stock 
drinking stations 
 
Indirect economic losses from change in 
production process 
Distributed Costs     Capital costs of fencing 
Labour costs for fencing/planting  
Cost of plants/shrubs/trees 




5.3 EXAMPLES OF APPROACHES TAKEN TO DATE  
To develop a policy addressing water quality and freshwater management, regional councils 
have to assess the extent of their localised environmental problem (if any) and tailor the policy 
to suit the expectations and norms within their region, while also complying with the local 
government legislation. Table 3 gives some examples of how regional councils approached the 
problem, to date. To give effect to the National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management, 
each region will have to set targets and create policy, and there will be increased focus on this 
issue in the coming years. The examples cited below are classified according to the type of 
approach discussed in the previous section – regulation, economic or voluntary policies. All case 
studies relate to freshwater quality and action that was taken to mitigate pollution effects on 
the freshwater system. A brief description of what the main policy issue in each case is given. 
Two of the voluntary approaches are discussed in more detail – one instigated by the regional 
council itself, the other by industry. 
Given that policy intervention requires a change in the rights and privileges of landowners with 
regards riparian zones, most regional councils choose to use a combination of complimentary 
responses using a mix of the three types of tools, and a focus on good communication between 
regulators and landowners at all stages. - 15 - 
 
Table 3 Summary of Case Studies and main issue the policy addressed
6 
Region/Name  Main Issue  Policy Approach 
Waikato region  Livestock access in waterways  Regulation, in targeted streams/ 
vulnerable areas, accompanied with 
information and advice. 
Southland  Deteriorating water quality 
due to livestock (especially 
cattle and deer). 
Regulation with limited financial 
assistance for riparian planting. 
Partnership between dairy industry and 
Regional Council. 




River contamination  Partnership approach in form of 
Manawatu River Leaders’ Forum and 
targeted subsidised riparian fencing and 





Promotion of sustainable dairy 
farming, reducing the impacts 
of dairying on the quality of 
NZ streams, rivers, lakes, 
groundwater and wetlands.   
Voluntary approach and partnership 
between industry and Regional Councils. 
Taranaki  Riparian management – stock 
exclusion and planted riparian 
zones 
Voluntary approach – partnership 
between landowners and regional council. 
Cost neutral scheme for provision of plants 





After soil erosion and damage 
from the 2004 floods 
especially in the hill country. 
Voluntary approach to develop “whole 
farm plans”. 
Regulatory responses involve changing the property rights structure around pollution and the 
activities allowed on properties. This is done through the rules and regulations allowed for 
under the RMA (Section 4). Planning rules can change pre-existing individual property rights, or 
indeed determine them. Zoning and environmental regulations are a common sense response to 
pollution  problems  (Wills,  1997),  as  they  reduce  the  costs  of  private  negotiation  between 
neighbours,  stakeholders  and  affected  parties  of  a  pollution  problem.  Planners  and  local 
government  have  the  power  to  change  property  rights  which  means  that  there  is  not  an 
absolute  immutable  set  of  rights  with  property  ownership.  In  order  to  ensure  compliance, 
                                                           
6 The case studies formed part of a study undertaken by Market Economics Ltd for Auckland Council in 
2011, looking at the public and private benefits of riparian management.  - 16 - 
 
regulatory  responses  require  an  enforcement  mechanism.  Indeed  it  is  for  this  reason  that 
Benett  (1999)  argues  that  regulation  can  exacerbate  the  ‘tragedy  of  the  commons’,  as  it 
discourages relationships of mutual responsibility between private actors and regulating agency. 
This is an erosion of ‘linking’ social capital. Regulation change in the RMA can be a litigious 
process. 
Economic policy instruments or market based instruments try to bring market advantages to 
situations,  where  private  actions  do  not  lead  to  socially  optimal  outcomes.  Examples  of 
economic policy instruments used by regional councils include nitrogen trading on Lake Taupo, 
and subsidisation of the costs of stream fencing and riparian planting on particular areas of the 
Manawatu river.  
Voluntary approaches seem to be the default course taken by many regional councils, when the 
political will or environmental pressures were not great enough to use regulatory or economic 
instruments. For example, Auckland published best practice guidelines for riparian management 
(Auckland Regional Council, 2001) but had little influence over water pollution brought about by 
livestock accessing streams. Nor were they able to ensure that stream banks and riparian zones 
were taken care of. This is an example of a ‘passive’ voluntary approach. There were instances 
of ‘active’ voluntary approaches to riparian management, as in the Taranaki region (Box 3). It is 
these ‘active’ voluntary approaches that offer interesting governance opportunities for regional 
councils, and the potential to enhance social capital. 
Box 3 Management of riparian margins in Taranaki 
The  Taranaki  region  is  seen  as  a  leader  in  terms  of  successfully  implementing  a  voluntary 
scheme through its Riparian Management Strategy. Taranaki Regional Council has no rules in 
any of the regional plans that specifically address riparian management. Instead, the Taranaki 
Regional Council takes an advocacy role, and promotes good practice through education and 
implementation of the Riparian Management Strategy.  
 
This approach has been underway since 1993, and it is definitely a forerunner to other voluntary 
schemes that came into operation. The Taranaki Regional Council works alongside landowners 
to improve riparian management in the region, with the focus being on properties clustered 
around the base of Mt Taranaki (the ring plain catchment). This area is where the region’s land 
use is concentrated in dairy production, and the ring plain is bisected by more than 300 streams 
and rivers, which flow off the mountain. Nearly all farms in this area have some waterway 
running through the farm. In general, the quality of fresh water was relatively good, given high 
rainfall flushing out the streams.  
 
A collaborative strategy has been developed for nearly twenty years, where the Council has 
helped  raise  awareness  of  the  importance  of  effective  riparian  management  and  provides 
information and advice to the public and landowners about this issue. 
 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  Fonterra  Dairying  and  Clean  Stream  Accord,  the  Council  has 
worked closely in this partnership approach (although Taranaki’s approach included dry stock - 17 - 
 
farms from the outset). The Taranaki Riparian Management Strategy introduced the staged 
targeting process for fencing and planting, which the Accord adopted. 
 
While  implementation  of  these  plans  is  voluntary,  the  Council  has  put  in  place  policies  to 
encourage uptake.  As well as providing information about the benefits of riparian planting, the 
council has helped to lower the costs of implementation by contracting with nurseries to buy 
plants in bulk and selling them at cost to farmers, which is a cost saving for farmers and revenue 
neutral for the Council. The Council has also worked with companies like Fonterra to offer prize 
draws for farmers taking part in the programme.    
 
So far the Council has sold over 2 million plants with 12 per cent of its target riparian areas 
planted to date.  The Council’s focus is now shifting from providing riparian management plans 
to ensuring that they are implemented, they aim to have 90 per cent of target riparian areas 
planted by 2015 (Taranaki Regional Council, personal communication). 
 
 
The emergence of partnerships in New Zealand has not gone unnoticed, and is described by 
Larner and Craig (2005) as moving social governance well beyond the narrow, market-oriented 
contractualism of earlier forms of neoliberalism, to a new era of joined up, inclusive governance. 
New Zealand’s largest company in terms of exports and share of world market (in its industry 
classification) is Fonterra, which is a cooperative. A cooperative is a business partnership, and of 
interest  in  its  own  right,  in  terms  of  the  formation  of  social  capital.  Fonterra  instigated  a 
voluntary approach to stream management, largely centred on farm effluent rather than stock 
accessing streams and waterways (Box 4).  
Box 4 Dairying and Clean Streams Accord 
 
The Dairying and Clean Streams Accord was signed by the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister 
for the Environment, the Chairman of Fonterra Co-operative Group and the Chairman of the 
Regional Affairs Committee, Local Government New Zealand (on behalf of Regional Councils) in 
May  2003.  The  Accord  reflects  an  agreement  between  these  parties  to  improve  the 
environmental performance of dairying and it establishes a goal of achieving “clean healthy 
water in dairying areas”. 
Five priorities for action are identified in the Accord to reduce the impact of dairying on streams, 
rivers, lakes and wetlands, as follows: 
  dairy cattle to be excluded form 90 per cent of Accord-type streams (defined as deeper 
than ankle deep, wider than 1metre and permanently flowing), rivers and lakes by 2012.   
  ninety per cent of dairy cattle stream crossings to have bridges or culverts by 2012; 
  dairy shed effluent to comply with resource consents (supposed to come into effect 
immediately in 2003); 
  dairy farms to have nutrient management plans in place; and - 18 - 
 
  regionally significant or important wetlands to be fenced. 
Fonterra  monitor  the  progress  of  dairy  farmers  toward  the  goals,  with  regional  councils 
monitoring the compliance with regional plans and resource consents for dairy effluent disposal. 
The progress in 2010 is shown in Figure 2 below. Of note is the staged approach to water 
exclusion, the bridging of crossings and streams (which are costly, in terms of both labour and 
capital)  and  relatively  good  progress  toward these aims.  However, only 63  per  cent of  the 
monitored farms complied with existing regional council consents regarding dairy effluent.  
Figure 2  Progress of the Dairying and Clean Streams Accord targets 2007/08-2008/10 
Source: MAF, 2011. 
This is a regulation, a pre-condition to getting a permit to farm. Yet one in three dairy farms are 
not complying with this, and are not i nternalising the costs of effluent ponds, showing that 
regulation is not always successful at achieving objectives. It shows that dairy farmers are not 
prioritising the costs of regulatory compliance. Yet the resource consent enables the farmer to 
conduct dairying activities, and hence this non-compliance is of concern. 
 Fonterra is concerned with this non-compliance, and in August 2010, introduced a new national 
initiative – Every Farm, Every Year. This will mean Fonterra checks every farm’s dairy effluent 
system annually – and they have ten Sustainable Dairying Specialists to support this programme. 
This is in addition to the Environmental Programs Specialists that work with farmers on the 
Clean Streams Accord. 
In terms of policy adoption, there usually are policy laggards – people who resist change. Equally 
there are environmental innovators, and the Fonterra Stream Accord is a good mechanism to 
share best-practice approaches between farms. 
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The devolution of water quality to the regions through the RMA has resulted in a variety of 
policy approaches throughout the country. Some regional councils are progressive and active in 
management of riparian zones, especially regarding stock access to streams. A mix of regulatory, 
economic and voluntary approaches are evident, tailor made to suit the priorities in each region. 
This section has focused moreso on the voluntary approaches, and are discussed further in light 
of the potential for social capital creation, in the following section. 
 
6.  VOLUNTARY  RIPARIAN  MANAGEMENT  AND  SOCIAL  CAPITAL 
DISCUSSION 
Freshwater management is an example of a common pool resource problem.  The solution to 
such problems is effective governance of the resource, oftentimes through mobilising the local 
stakeholders of that resource (Ostrom, 2005). In so doing groups of individuals cooperate and 
networks are formed, based around a shared problem.  Water quality management along a 
stream  network  involves  a  set  of  landowners  who  may  not  know  each  other.  They  all  are 
involved  in  governing  the  freshwater  resource  (along  with  other  stakeholders,  such  as 
environmental and interest groups and the regulating agency), but may not have contact with 
one another. The regional council has a role in ‘bonding’ this set of stakeholders so they can 
help design and take control over the governance of their natural resource.  
An ‘active’ voluntary approach to a group problem seeks to establish social acceptance of a 
practice, such that the practice will be implemented by the respective stakeholders involved. 
This requires ‘social learning’ for stakeholders and sharing a common set of values. In terms of 
riparian management, the landowner and the public interest need to be aligned. This requires 
an  understanding  of  the  public  benefits  associated  with  maintaining  riparian  zones  and 
restricting stock access to the waterways. This paper has shown the joint benefits, for society or 
the common good and for private landowners. Education, information and extension activities 
are  important  instruments  to  increase  awareness.  Raising  awareness  of  pollution  issues, 
involving  stakeholders  and  trying  to  develop  ideas  on  the  basis of meaningful  dialogue  are 
means of achieving social acceptance of principles. For riparian management, this could include 
the establishment of demonstration sites in public parks and reserves, with clear interpretation 
of the science behind the riparian zone, including most appropriate plants, the timing for their 
planting etc. It also includes the regulators understanding the constraints at a farm level, and 
trade-offs  that  are  made.  Education  programmes  within  schools  are  another  means  of 
influencing future behaviour, and could also be undertaken as part of community involvement 
in riparian planting. 
Voluntary policy encourages personal responsibility, and marks a radically different approach to 
strict regulation. It marks a progressive departure of how policymakers think about the division - 20 - 
 
of responsibilities between the individual and the state. There are strong moral and political 
arguments  for  protecting  and  enhancing  personal  responsibility.  This  places  a  value  on 
individuals’ and communities’ ability to take control and act in their own best interests (Halpern 
et al., 2004). Ideally this best interest should coincide with society’s best interest once there is 
awareness of the effects of the damaging effects of stock access to the waterways, as in the case 
study used in this paper. There is a mature and growing body of knowledge in psychology 
offering a more sophisticated approach to behaviour and behavioural change, which can be 
used as a valid policy approach. The simple economic theories see people as rational economic 
actors, maximising welfare through making perfectly informed decisions based on complete 
data. Real human psychology is more complicated and involves many other factors: cultural, 
social, community networks, physical environments, genetic predispositions and so on (Bowles 
and  Gintis,  2002).  The  drawback  is  that  a  successful  voluntary  approach  needs  to  be  well 
designed, so as to engage the farmers and landowners in an empowering way, where they 
perceive they retain control over their actions. This is not necessarily the case when adhering to 
regulation, as they must comply to a rule which is mandatory. However, an active voluntary 
approach does not guarantee that the principles will be implemented or acted upon. This lack of 
certainty in outcome is also pervasive in regulating the pollution of waterways. Detection of 
non-compliance is difficult in a non-point stream network, although not impossible (although 
monitoring systems can be very expensive). 
If regional councils adopted an ‘active’ voluntary approach to riparian management, a process of 
‘bridging’ the groups and networks could take place. This would involve sharing best practice 
and learning from the actions of other groups in different regions. Social learning would occur at 
this point, with the regional councils acting as a catalyst in the process.  
The  establishment  of  environmental  partnerships  plays  an  important  role  in  ‘linking’  social 
capital.  In  particular  strengthening  the  relationship  between  individuals,  ratepayers  and 
communities (broadly defined) with the formal governing authorities (local government). If the 
functions of local government are pared back to core services and stringent environmental 
regulation, there  is  little scope  for  the creation of  trust  between  individuals  and  governing 
agencies. This is an opportunity lost, as it disables the use of a valuable resource which is 
present in all regions of New Zealand: that of social capital.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The issue of freshwater quality is inherently complex. The actions of one user are felt by those 
downstream and thus effective management requires the buy-in of many land owners and land-
users.  The  issue  also  involves  a  range  of  regulators  and  policy  makers  in  nested  areas  of - 21 - 
 
jurisdiction tailoring policies to suit the differing physical nature of the freshwater system and 
the stressors that pervade in that area/region.  
This paper recognised that effective riparian management offers benefits which will be enjoyed 
by the wider public as well as privately, by the property owners involved. Public benefits include 
health effects of clean streams, ‘non-use’ values as well as the knowledge that the waterways 
will be kept for future generations. Private benefits include a retention or increase of land value, 
retention of productive land and water resources and aesthetic benefits amongst others. 
When  public  and  private  benefits  are  aligned  there  is  scope  for  collective  action  for  all 
stakeholders.  This  requires  the  formation  of  a  network,  with  inclusive  membership.  Such  a 
network builds social capital, and strengthens the bonds between the stakeholders.  Formation 
of the group is not spontaneous, and may require coordination. It is at this point that the 
regional council can act as a catalyst in social capital formation, facilitating the actions of the 
group. This paper explored the emergence of such groups with regard riparian management, 
satisfying requirements for managing the freshwater system under the RMA and the integration 
of four well-beings under the LGA.  
Voluntary  approaches  to  riparian  management  have  worked  well  in  some  regions  of  New 
Zealand, but if the landowners are simply unable to meet the costs of fencing and planting the 
waterways, the desired outcome of restoring riparian zones will not be achieved, and indeed the 
amenity value of farmed landscapes may disappear – it may be more profitable to use the land 
for non-farming activities. Therefore voluntary approaches are not suitable for all situations, and 
require careful design. This paper highlighted benefits relating to social capital formation that 
are associated with voluntary approaches, while recognising its limitations. 
A voluntary approach seeks to establish social acceptance of a practice, such that the practice 
will be implemented by the respective stakeholders involved. The advantage of a voluntary 
approach is that it is unobtrusive, landowners that modify their behaviour would do so willingly 
and the perceived control or power balance does not shift from the landowner/user to the 
regulating  authority.  In  the  Taranaki  case  study,  a  partnership  approach  emerged  as  being 
acceptable to farming communities, given that the landowners retain a sense of control over 
their actions. This can take a hybrid form of governance – with shared decision making powers 
vested in the community, landowners and authorities. This requires social learning and sharing a 
common set of values. It is a more conciliatory approach than contesting rights through the 
judiciary system, and possibly more cost effective as it reduces the transaction costs of the 
judicial process, commonly associated with the RMA. 
Social capital is formed when networks of individuals form a common bond or interest between 
them. In society many networks exist, ranging from social friendships to formalised business 
groups. This is a form of capital which can be used for productive purposes. As yet, it remains - 22 - 
 
largely untapped in the governance of natural resources. There is potential to use existing and 
create social capital through processes of well-designed environmental partnerships.  Regional 
councils have a role to play in this regard, as they are centrally placed to anchor partnerships 
and strengthen their formation, hence strengthening social networks within the regions.  - 23 - 
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